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Abstract
Unemployment pressures among nationals are emerging in the Cooperation Council for the
Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) [1]. At a time when a rapidly growing number of young
nationals are entering the labor force and governments are no longer able to act as employers
of first and last resort, the non-oil sector continues to rely on expatriate labor to meet its labor
requirements in most GCC countries. In this environment, policymakers face the related
challenges of addressing unemployment pressures, while striking a balance between
maintaining a liberal foreign labor policy and a reasonable level of competitiveness of the
non-oil sector. Using a matching function framework, this paper examines labor market
policies that are likely to expand the ability to hire nationals in the non-oil sector. It finds that
an effective labor strategy should focus on strengthening investment in human capital,
adopting institutional reforms, and promoting a vibrant non-oil economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Labor markets in the member countries of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the
Gulf (GCC) are getting tighter, and unemployment pressures are emerging among young
nationals. High growth in the national or local population during the past decades, together
with the rising participation of women in the labor force, is translating into a rapidly growing
supply of nationals seeking employment. Indeed, the local labor force has been growing at an
average annual rate of 4–5 percent over the past decade, and is likely to continue to grow at
this pace over the medium term since more than one-third of the local population is below the
age of 15 years [2].
Unemployment pressures among nationals have been restrained until recently because most
GCC governments have been acting as employers of first and last resort. As a result,

nationals currently constitute most of the workforce in the public sector. This strategy,
however, has practically reached its limits because the wage bill has become too large to
keep rising at a time of pressing needs in order to satisfy the demand for government services
of a young population (Figure 1). The wage bill now represents more than 10 percent of GDP
in most countries. Thus, the responsibility for job creation in the period ahead is likely to rest
with the private non-oil sector. This will not be an easy task. During the past three decades,
a liberal foreign labor policy has allowed the private non-oil sector to rely mainly on
relatively less expensive, better-trained, and more flexible foreign workers to support its
development. The result is segmented labor markets as well as a low elasticity of substitution
between national and foreign workers.

Against this background, policymakers in the GCC countries need to cast the right balance
between dealing with the pressures of a rapidly rising local labor force and maintaining a
flexible policy toward the hiring of expatriate workers. Otherwise, unemployment among
GCC nationals could rise or the competitiveness of the non-oil economy could be
compromised. The extent of the problem varies across these countries. Bahrain, Oman, and
Saudi Arabia face a more pressing challenge than the other countries, given their relatively
large national workforce. Policies are currently geared toward encouraging the replacement
of foreign workers with local workers through a combination of mandatory and market-based
mechanisms, and promotion of non-oil economic growth.
This paper examines policies to address these labor market challenges facing GCC countries.
To this end, a matching function framework is used that, to our knowledge, has not been

applied before to GCC countries. The next section reviews the main characteristics of the
labor market in GCC countries, putting together data from various sources. The third section
analyzes labor market dynamics and emerging strains, and the fourth section presents current
policy responses and strategies. The fifth section develops an analytical framework to assess
current as well as new policies, while the concluding section summarizes the policy lessons.
II. THE LABOR MARKET IN GCC COUNTRIES
A. Demographic Profile
The population of the GCC countries is relatively small. The total population, including
expatriates, was estimated at almost 32 million in 2000. Saudi Arabia has the largest
population, 22 million, while Bahrain and Qatar have the lowest (Table 1). The expatriate
population is about one-fourth of the total in Saudi Arabia, but accounts for more than
70 percent of the total in the smaller countries.
High fertility rates over the past decades have translated into high population growth.
Although these rates have declined from 6.4 births per woman in 1980 to the current rate of
3.5 births per woman, they remain high by international standards, particularly in Oman and
Saudi Arabia where they are significantly above the regional average. As a result, the GCC
population continues to grow at over 3 percent a year [3]. Moreover, a large proportion of the
population is aged 0 to 14 years, with the average population age ranging between 26 and
30 years. The dependency ratio (the number of dependents per worker) has also remained
high, reaching, for instance, 96 percent in Saudi Arabia in 2000 compared to 72 percent in
other Arab countries.
Table 1. Selected Economic Indicators, 2002
Nominal GDP
(In millions of
U.S. dollars)
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudia Arabia
U.A.E.
GCC

8,506
33,215
20,761
17,321
188,960
71,187
339,950

Overall Fiscal
Nominal GDP
Balance (In
Per Capita (In
Population
percent of
U.S. dollars) 1/ (In millions) 1/
GDP) 2/
11,619
15,098
7,752
28,362
8,567
19,613
12,026 4/

0.7
2.2
2.7
0.6
22.1
3.6
31.9

Sources: National authorities; IMF staff estimates
1/ Including expatriates.
2/ Includes investment income of government foreign assets.
3/ Based on current production.
4/ Weighted average.

0.8
20.6
8.9
8.3
-6
-9.3
2.2 4/

Total Govt.
Gross Debt (In
in percent of
GDP)

Proven Oil
Reserves (In
years) 3/

30.3
32.9
17
53.4
97.1
4.5
66.7 4/

15
134
16
15
85
124
84 4/

B. An Overview of GCC Labor Markets
A distinguishing characteristic of labor markets in GCC countries is the large share of
expatriate workers in the labor force. The number of foreign workers in these countries
increased fivefold from 1.1 million in 1970 to 5.2 million in 2000 [4]. A decade later, the
United Nations estimates that the expatriate workforce will have risen to about 5.5 million,
of which 3.7 million will reside in Saudi Arabia. Expatriate workers currently account for
between 50 percent of employed workers in Saudi Arabia and 90 percent in the U.A.E.
An initial inflow of foreign workers took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. The oil price
booms at that time resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for labor to build up the GCC
countries’ physical and social infrastructure. To satisfy this demand, and in light of the
relatively small size of local populations, the GCC countries adopted an open door policy to
foreign labor.
This policy has been maintained through today in all GCC countries—albeit with some
added restrictions over the years—to support the development of non-oil activities [5].
In addition, shortage in skilled national labor has led to continued reliance on foreign labor,
while contributing to keeping labor costs down. Access to a highly elastic supply of
expatriate workers at internationally competitive wages and flexible contracts has also
contributed to avoiding a sharp deterioration in competitiveness of the non-oil sector, usually
observed in oil (or other natural resource) rich economies [6]. This access has also been
important to increase the resilience of the GCC economies to terms of trade shocks in the
context of de facto fixed exchange rate regimes.
Foreign workers are subject to a relatively flexible labor framework. They are hired on
limited-duration work assignments based on a sponsorship system. This system facilitates
their hiring and dismissal process by the company that brings them into the country on a
work contract. Expatriates are attracted to work in the GCC area because their expected
earnings is higher than in their home countries—most of them currently come from India and
other Asian countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines [7]. They also benefit from
subsidized government services, such as energy, education, and health (although they pay
higher rates than nationals), and lack of income and consumption taxes, enhancing their
savings opportunities. In fact, in the second half of the 1990s, foreign workers
have transferred abroad, on average, between 6 and 11 percent of GDP a year, or between
$2,500–$4,500 per head (Figure 2).

The continued large expatriate presence in GCC countries is also reflected in a segmentation
of the labor market in terms of wages, skills, and sectors of employment for national and
non-nationals. Underlying this segmentation has been the (implicit) guarantee of employment
in the government sector extended to nationals, who prefer to work in this sector because of
relatively high wages, job security, social allowances, and generous retirement benefits [8].
Moreover, promotion in the government sector is mainly based on seniority rather than
performance, while relatively shorter working hours than in the private sector (and
restrictions on foreign investment) have allowed civil servants to run other incomeaugmenting endeavors on the side. All these elements have resulted over time in a large gap
between the private and public sector wage and benefit structures, leading to high reservation
wages [9]. Consequently, in most GCC countries, except Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, more
than 60 percent of the national labor force is employed in the public sector, which has also
absorbed most of the national women entering the labor market over the past decade
(Figure 3).
In contrast, expatriates work mostly for the non-oil private sector and account, on average,
for more than 85 percent of total employed workers in that sector. Private employers prefer to
hire non-national workers because their cost is relatively lower—though the difference in
cost vis-à-vis national workers is likely to narrow the higher the skill level. Expatriate
workers are also relatively better trained and have in practice a more flexible contract

arrangement that facilitates hiring and firing. In addition, their wages are more flexible.
For instance, in the U.A.E., average nominal wages in local currency in the private sector
declined by almost 8 percent from 1997–2001, particularly in trade activities. This decline
probably reflected weak international labor markets following the Asian financial crisis of
1998 as well as the strengthening of the U.A.E. dirham vis-à-vis currencies in Asia. In
contrast, government services’ wages increased by 11 percent over the same period, in line
with domestic inflation. Moreover, private employers are generally reluctant to train national
workers, who may, at any time, leave the company that has incurred their training cost.
Another aspect of the segmentation is a mismatch in skills supplied by national workers and
those demanded by the private sector. Although education is free for nationals at all levels,
the courses offered often do not reflect the requirements of the market. Nationals take
advantage of this free education with the expectation of guaranteed public employment at
any level of education and profession. In Qatar, for instance, half of the national workforce in
the government sector only held a secondary or lower level of education in 1997—the last
year of available information. Indeed, the majority of university graduates in GCC countries
pursued studies related to social or religious studies rather than technical fields and business
administration, where private sector requirements are the greatest. According to the Arab
Human Development Report (2002), 38 percent of graduates from universities in the GCC
countries completed studies related to social or Islamic studies, 34 percent in education, but
only 11 percent in business administration, and 18 percent in technical fields. In addition,
enrollment at the tertiary (or university) level of education, although it has risen over time,
has remained low, ranging between 8 percent in Oman and 26 percent in Bahrain and Qatar.
Enrollment at the secondary level of education has also been surprisingly low—in most GCC
countries remaining below 70 percent, except in Bahrain, where it reached 94 percent in
1998.
Another characteristic of labor markets in GCC countries is the limitations to labor mobility.
With nationals confined in the public sector in most GCC countries, expatriates’ inter-job
mobility is restrained primarily by the sponsorship system. At the regional level, mobility is
also limited, even though since the mid-1980s, all GCC citizens have equal rights and free
mobility to work across GCC countries. This reflects in part the loss in social benefits,
such as land grants and housing loans that a national worker forgoes by not residing in
his/her own country.

III. EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS: EMERGING STRAINS
GCC countries have shown some dynamism in employment creation during the 1996–2000
period. The U.A.E. economy has been the most dynamic, creating, on average, more than
100,000 jobs a year in that period while the Saudi economy, which is almost four times larger
than the U.A.E. economy, created 130,000 jobs (Figure 4). The Kuwaiti and Omani
economies created about the same number of jobs for their nationals, and the Qatari economy
seemed to have created relatively the lowest number of jobs in the GCC area (although
information is partial).

The sources of employment generation and its beneficiaries have also differed across GCC
countries. In Bahrain, Oman, and the U.A.E., the majority of the jobs in the past years have

emanated from the private sector (Figure 5). In contrast, the public sector has continued to
account for more than three-quarters of employment growth in Kuwait and about half in
Saudi Arabia. In line with policies in place to encourage the hiring of national workers, these
workers were the main beneficiaries of job creation in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia
(Figure 6). In Kuwait and the U.A.E., in contrast, non-nationals reaped a large part of the
new jobs, probably reflecting their still low levels of unemployment among nationals. In
Qatar, reform in government ministries and the power sector resulted in a large number of
non-nationals losing their jobs. Despite this job creation, unemployment pressures seem to
have increased in the GCC area, affecting in particular first-time job seekers with a primary
or secondary education.

Sources: National authorities and Fund staff estimates
1/ No information available on Qatar
2/Government and mixed services only; covering the period 1993-98

Two main reasons could be advanced to explain these emerging strains in the GCC labor
markets. First, in some GCC countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, growth of the nonoil sector has remained weak relative to the rate of growth of the domestic labor
force. Second, most new jobs in the GCC area have been primarily created in the relatively
low-skill and low-wage sectors of the private non-oil economy, which continues to have
access to a plentiful supply of expatriate workers at internationally competitive salaries.
In fact, most of the new job opportunities created during the second half of the 1990s were in
trade, manufacturing, and domestic services, which have traditionally not appealed to
national workers. Job opportunities in the finance sector, which requires relatively more
skilled workers, have been limited, particularly in the U.A.E., where finance has accounted
on average for only 1 percent of total jobs created in 1996–2000 (Figure 7).
The employment elasticity (defined as growth in employment in response to non-oil output
growth) in GCC countries ranged between 0.5 and above 1, compared with international
averages of less than 0.7 (Figure 8). This relatively high elasticity in some GCC countries is
consistent with an expansion of employment in the low-skill, low-wage sectors, as mentioned
above.
The substitution of non-nationals with nationals has also encountered several obstacles.
First, with most new job opportunities requiring a relatively low level of education and
paying relatively low wages, the private sector has continued to offer these jobs mostly to
foreign workers. GCC nationals appear unwilling to accept these positions

Moreover, the outputs of the education and training systems are insufficiently compatible
with labor market requirements, resulting in a skill mismatch. This has hindered the
substitution of non-nationals working particularly in skilled positions. Although GCC
countries have made important strides in advancing education, the illiteracy rate remains
high, and enrollment in secondary and tertiary education remains below enrollment levels
prevailing in countries with similar per capita income [10]. For instance, in the private sector
(including public enterprises), 43 percent of Qataris had a tertiary level of education
compared to 53 percent for expatriates. In the Omani banking sector, the difference was even
larger, with one-third of nationals having a tertiary level of education compared to 85 percent
of expatriates (Figure 9).

Despite emerging strains in the labor markets, the wage expectations of the national new
entrants in the labor force seem to have remained high and rigid. This reflects in part
continued expectations by GCC nationals that they will ultimately get a job in the
government sector, even though this strategy seems to have reached its limits, becoming an
inefficient social safety net [11]. Indeed, as indicated earlier, the size of the wage bill as a
share of total expenditures and as a percentage of GDP has risen steadily in most GCC
countries during the 1990s. However, information on wages in Saudi Arabia shows that over
the 1997–2001 period, average nominal wages for Saudi nationals in all sectors declined by
12 percent (compared to almost a 17 percent fall for non-Saudis). This indicates that
nationals may have started to accept lower entry salaries.
IV. POLICY RESPONSES AND STRATEGIES
The GCC countries’ labor policies have evolved over time to take into account changing
labor market conditions. In the 1980s, GCC governments and state-owned enterprises gave
priority to nationals in recruitment, resulting in a rapid nationalization of the public sector
labor force that helped contain unemployment pressures. By the early 1990s, the share of
nationals had already reached more than 80 percent of the civil service and about half in
state-owned enterprises in some GCC countries, such as Bahrain (Appendix I).
During the past decade, the focus shifted toward nationalization of the private sector
workforce. This shift took place because governments realized that they could not
indefinitely take the lead role in employing national workers. In addition, governments have

started to demand specialized career stream professionals, such as in education and health,
because of population dynamics.
To achieve the nationalization of the private sector workforce, a common strategy in GCC
countries has been to rely on mandatory measures. These include quantitative targets or
quotas on the proportion of nationals employed by private companies in specific professions
or sectors (Table 2). Although this strategy has been in place in some GCC countries since
the early 1990s, the absorption of national workers by the private sector still remains a
challenge. This challenge reflects practical difficulties to enforce the targets for each and
every firm, and the private sector’s continued unlimited access to expatriate labor at
internationally competitive wages [12]. In addition, the GCC authorities have applied quotas
in a collaborative rather than in a coercive manner, since forced placement of nationals could
result in lower productivity and increased costs to the employer and the economy, hindering
long-run growth and ultimately job creation. GCC countries have also relied on
administrative measures to increase the relative cost of hiring expatriates, such as regulating
the supply of work permits for foreigners. Other measures include adoption of fees or a
(training) tax paid by employers to hire foreign workers. Most GCC countries have also
provided incentives to private employers to hire nationals by rewarding tenders that meet
quota requirements.
More recently, mandatory and administrative measures have become part of a broader effort
to simultaneously improve the skills of national workers. In this context, GCC countries have
adopted market-based strategies, such as improving training and education in line with
private sector requirements. The GCC authorities are intensifying efforts to eliminate the gap
between the output of the local educational systems and the requirements of the market and
to reduce the rates of repetition and dropouts as well as the average number of years invested
for the graduation of students. They have also attempted to equalize the perceived
attractiveness of public and private employment by extending retirement benefits
and social allowances to all nationals independently of the sector that they work for.
Some GCC countries (notably Oman and the U.A.E.) are currently focusing on encouraging
self-employment of the national labor force. These efforts have included providing soft loans
to young nationals who want to start small businesses, as well as offering training in
partnership with established companies to the private sector.

Given that the extent of the labor market challenge differs across GCC countries, the
implementation and emphasis on the policies and strategies mentioned above have also
varied from one to another. Qatar, with a relatively small national working age population,
has been more lenient in implementing nationalization policies, and is currently relying
mainly on improving training and strengthening education to increase the ability to employ
nationals in the private sector. The U.A.E. has avoided using quotas, except on the share of
nationals employed in the banking sector. This sector demands relatively skilled labor and
pays on average the highest wages in the private sector.
Increasing strains in their labor markets have been also reflected in longer search periods
after graduation and tightening employment prospects for nationals. The Kuwaiti authorities
have recently decided to reinforce mandatory limits or quotas for the employment of

expatriates in the private sector, even though unemployment is officially estimated at less
than 3 percent.
Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, in contrast, have more forcefully applied quotas to
promote the nationalization of the labor force. This reflects their relatively larger indigenous
population and probably relatively higher unemployment rates. In 2001, the Omanization of
the labor force reached 81 percent and 91 percent of the hydrocarbon sector and commercial
banks, respectively. In other sectors that require less skilled labor, the progress has been
modest—reaching, for instance, less than 40 percent of the workforce in the hotel industry.
Limited progress in upgrading the local workforce to meet market requirements and in
narrowing the remuneration gap, have continued to hinder the hiring capacity of the local
labor force in the private sector. In addition, given that the majority of the expatriates have a
low level of education, the nationalization of the labor force through substitution is also
limited (to probably less than 30 percent of the expatriate workforce). Robust non-oil
economic growth is not expected to be sufficient to create new jobs for nationals in the
period ahead. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for instance, the authorities projected in the
Seventh Development Plan that the Saudi labor force is likely to rise by 817,000 workers in
the period 2000-04. The Saudiization program is expected to provide about 60 percent of
new job opportunities, even though private sector real growth is projected to average about
5 percent per year in that period. Most of the new jobs will likely be created in construction,
agriculture, trade, and personal services—traditional areas of occupation of expatriate
workers. The creation of job opportunities for nationals in the private sector therefore
remains a challenge in GCC countries.
V. A MATCHING MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT FOR NATIONALS
The policy responses of the GCC authorities may be formally analyzed in a matching model,
which is the standard framework for understanding employment dynamics [13]. Such a
framework allows for an investigation of the incentives and institutions that may affect the
unemployment outcome in the GCC area. In fact, GCC labor market institutions are different
from those in Europe and other areas analyzed in the standard literature [14]. Wage
bargaining, or the sharing of the firm’s surplus, in general, does not apply to the private nonoil sector in the GCC economies. Firms have access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers
at internationally competitive wages, and labor unions are absent. As a consequence, workers
have negligible bargaining power.
This section presents a slightly modified version of the standard matching model
incorporating elements specific to the GCC area [15]. The focus is on the employment of
nationals by the private non-oil sector. Therefore, the decisions of nationals in the labor force
and of firms are explicitly modeled. The employment decisions of the public sector and the
hiring of expatriate workers are not explicitly modeled, but their impact on national
employment is captured.
In the model, nationals may either be employed in the private sector or unemployed [16].
Being “unemployed” may be interpreted as being “employed” (or expecting to be employed)
in the public sector. If nationals are employed in the private sector, they receive wages, w.

They may also receive benefits from the government while employed in the private sector,
bE, bringing the total compensation to w+bE. Unemployed nationals receive (or expect to
receive) benefits, bu, which are the public sector wages and benefits. Therefore, bu is the
reservation wage below which nationals will not accept private-sector employment.
In other words, to even begin the discussion of the ability of the private sector to employ
nationals, w+bE > bu.
Firms seek to fill jobs. Each filled job or matched position generates output, y, for the firm
[17]. The firm pays wages, w, and earns y–w. For the firm to remain competitive, w should be
less than or equal to y; otherwise, the firm would eventually shut down. If the position is
vacant, then the firm searches for an appropriate match. In doing so, it incurs a cost, c, which
depends on, among other things, the ease with which firms can find substitutes, namely,
skilled or semi-skilled expatriate workers, to fill the position. Suppose that, on average,
a proportion “s” of existing matches is broken at each point in time; in other words, the
separation rate is s. When a match is broken, firms pay a separation cost, cs ≥ 0. For higher
values of cs, separation is more costly for the firm.
Finally, assume that the process of successfully matching job aspirants with vacancies is
described by a matching function, M = M(U,V), where M denotes the number of successful
matches, U is the number of unemployed nationals, and V is the number of job vacancies
posted by firms. Let q ≡ M(U,V)/V denote the probability of filling a vacancy. Define θ ≡ V/U
as a measure of the tightness of the labor market; as the labor market becomes tighter,
θ increases. If M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree one, then q is a function of θ:
q(θ) = M(U,V)/V. Moreover, the probability of an unemployed national finding a job is
θ q(θ) = M(U,V)/U.
As in the literature, let the matching function be Cobb-Douglas: M = A Uα V1-α, where
α ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment, and A is the efficiency
of the matching “technology” or process. Measures that raise A increase the efficiency of the
searching and matching process and shorten the time to find a match. Such measures include
information dissemination and, more generally, job search support, including internships and
the establishment of a national job database.
The unemployment dynamics may now be formally described. In each time period, there is a
flow of people into unemployment comprised of new entrants into the labor force (young
nationals, including women) and workers whose private-sector jobs are eliminated. At the
same time, firms are looking to fill vacancies, and M successful matches are occurring, which
constitutes the flow out of unemployment. Therefore, the change in unemployment is given
by:
U t +1 = U t + ( N t +1 − N t ) + s ( N t − U t ) − θt q (θt )U t ,
where Nt is the number of nationals in the work force at time t. Dividing by Nt, substituting
for the unemployment rate, ut = Ut/Nt, and re-writing the equation yields:
(1 + g N )ut +1 = ( s + g N ) + [1 − s − θ t q (θt )]ut ,

where gN is the growth rate of the labor force, [s+gN] is the increase in the unemployment
rate owing to the flow into unemployment, and θ q(θ) u is the decrease owing to the flow out
of unemployment through successful matches.
The above equation can be solved for the steady state unemployment rate, uss. In the steady
state, u is constant; uss is given by:
s + gN
u ss =
s + g N + θ ss q(θ ss )
where θss is the steady state value for the market tightness indicator, θ. Note that an increase
in the labor force growth rate, gN, translates into a higher steady-state unemployment rate for
a constant level of θ q(θ). Thus, the equation captures the dynamics of emerging strains in
GCC labor markets owing to demographic pressures.
To complete the characterization of unemployment, a solution for θ is needed. Consider two
scenarios. In the first scenario, wages are given by the internationally competitive wage, w*,
for skilled and semi-skilled expatriates. Nationals have no bargaining power since firms have
access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers at w*. In the second scenario, quantitative
restrictions on the employment of expatriates give some bargaining power to national
workers, which lead to wages being determined within the model.
A. Case 1: No Wage Bargaining
For the case where private-sector wages are given by w*, the steady state unemployment rate,
uss, is:
1
u ss =
1
1
1
1
1−
1−
−1
−1 α
α
α
α
1 + ( s + g N ) A c ( y − w * − β scs ) (r + s )
and the comparative statistics are:
u ss

= u ( y,
−

A, s, c, cs , w*, g N )
−

+

+

+

+

+

.

The unemployment rate is negatively related to output or productivity, y, and matching
efficiency, A, while it is positively related to the separation rate, s, search costs, c,
separation costs, cs, and the international wage rate, w*. An increase in y, owing to
investment in physical and human capital as well as improvements in efficiency (or total
factor productivity), leads to greater profits and, hence, increased hiring and a lower
unemployment rate. Similarly, improvements in matching efficiency, A, such as through
increased information dissemination and job support mechanisms, lead to a greater number
of matches for a given level of labor market tightness, and hence to a lower unemployment
rate.
Measures to reduce the separation rate and search costs would also reduce the unemployment
rate. A lower separation rate results in a lower flow into unemployment. Moreover, reduced

search costs translate into a higher match rate for a given level of resources that a firm puts
into searching. Upgrading the skills of the local workforce in line with private sector
requirements, through educational reforms and vocational training, would reduce the
separation rate and search costs for appropriately trained national employees.
Lower separation costs, including firing costs, make it less costly for a firm to fire national
employees as well as hire them. Therefore, labor market reforms that make it easier for firms
to separate from national workers while at the same time increasing mobility would lower the
unemployment rate among nationals. In addition, measures lowering costs of hiring
nationals, including wages, would decrease unemployment. In the model, a drop in the
international wage rate, w*, increases the profits of the firm for a given revenue level, y.
Subsidizing the hiring of nationals, through time-specific cash benefits to firms which hire
nationals, and rewarding tenders that meet quota requirements would enhance profitability.
Mandatory and administrative measures have an ambiguous effect on unemployment. On one
hand, more vacancies would be created with the need to substitute nationals for expatriates
[18]. On the other hand, even excluding the impact of these measures on the bargaining
power and wages of nationals, such measures could reduce output and productivity, y, and
hence competitiveness, if nationals have lower human capital than skilled expatriate workers.
Improvements in training and education would alleviate the effect on productivity.
In summary, a policy strategy aimed at increasing physical and human capital investment and
institutional reform would lower the unemployment rate, u. Investment would increase the
productivity of the non-oil private sector, y. Institutional reforms, such as through labor
market reforms, would raise the efficiency of the matching process, A, as well as reduce the
costs of searching, c, and separation, cs. In addition, investment in human capital would
likely lower the probability of separation, s.
B. Case 2: Expatriate Labor Restrictions and Wage Bargaining
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates result in an increase in
the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms. As a result, wages are no longer
determined by the internationally competitive wage, but will be higher. The steady state
unemployment rate for the case of expatriate labor restrictions is obtained by solving the
following two equations:

u ss =

1
1
=
−1 ss
ss
1 + ( s + g N ) θ q(θ ) 1 + ( s + g N ) −1 A(θ ss )1−α

c[1 − β (1 − s)](θ ss )α + cβ Aφθ ss = β A(1 − φ )( y − β scs + bE − bU )
Although a single closed-form equation cannot be obtained, the comparative statistics are as
follows:
u ss = u ( y, A, s, c, cs , φ , bE , bU , g N )
− − + + + + −
+
+

The difference with the earlier specification is the endogenous determination of wages
involving the bargaining power, φ, government benefits to nationals employed in the private
sector, bE, and government benefits to unemployed nationals, bU. The signs of all other
variables, the logic, and the policy conclusions remain the same as before.
Greater bargaining power for national workers, reflected in higher values of φ, results in
higher wages. Given a level of output or productivity, y, higher wages imply lower
profitability for firms, which translate into lower probabilities of finding jobs and a higher
unemployment rate. Therefore, in addition to potential negative effects on productivity and
competitiveness, mandatory and administrative measures could have a deleterious effect on
national employment by increasing φ. The stronger the measures, the greater would be the
increase in φ and the more negative would be the effect on employment. Countries that have
taken strong measures could see a reversal of employment gains unless other measures, such
as improving training and education and enhancing labor market efficiency, are also swiftly
implemented.
Reducing the reservation wage of nationals, bU, would lower the private-sector wage for
nationals and lower the unemployment rate. Moreover, providing greater government
benefits to private-sector employed nationals, bE, means that workers are willing to accept
lower wages from firms, which lowers the cost of hiring nationals. Consequently, the firm’s
surplus increases and the unemployment rate falls.
C. Simulations
There is insufficient data to estimate econometrically the above model for the GCC countries.
In fact, there is insufficient data even to calibrate the model and conduct policy experiments.
To quantify the impact of the different policy recommendations, we choose a set of baseline
parameters that we believe are reasonable. We then use these parameters to calculate
elasticities.
For Case 1, we assume the following parameterization, which yields a steady-state
unemployment rate of 2.8 percent:
Parameter
Value

s
0.25

gN
0.05

A
1

α
0.4

c
0.3

y
1

w*
0.5

cs
0.3

r
0.05

The elasticity of steady-state unemployment to changes in each of the variables, y, A, s, c, cs,
and w*, may be calculated by changing each of the variables by 10 percent and computing
the new steady-state unemployment rate:

Variable shocked
y
A
s
c

New value of
variable
1.1
1.1
0.225
0.27

New steady state
unemployment rate
(In percent)
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.4

Elasticity of unemployment with respect
to 10 percent change in variable
(In percent)
-26.4
-20.7
-21.0
-14.3

cs
w*

0.27
0.45

2.7
2.4

-2.4
-14.9

In other words, a 10 percent increase in y reduces the steady state unemployment rate by
26.4 percent. Similarly, a reduction in the separation rate, s, by 10 percent reduces the
unemployment rate by 21 percent. Investment in human and physical capital and institutional
reforms that enhance productivity in the non-oil sector, y, increase matching efficiency, A,
reduce the separation probability, s, and lower search costs, c, can be expected to have large
effects on the unemployment rate.
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates that result in an
increase in the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms could increase steady
state unemployment significantly. For Case 2, we use the above parameterization, with the
following additional assumptions:
Parameter
Value

φ
0.25

bE
0.2

bU
0.5

These assumptions result in a baseline steady state unemployment rate of 11.3 percent,
which is substantially higher than the Case 1 steady state rate of 2.8 percent.
The elasticity of steady-state unemployment is calculated as above:

Variable shocked
y
A
s
c
cs

φ
bE
bU

New value of variable
1.1
1.1
0.225
0.27
0.27
0.225
0.22
0.45

New steady state
unemployment rate
(In percent)
10.3
10.2
10.2
10.5
11.2
10.6
11.1
10.7

Elasticity of unemployment
with respect to 10 percent
change in variable
(In percent)
-9.3
-10.0
-9.9
-6.8
-0.7
-6.6
-2.1
-5.0

The elasticity of unemployment to changes in each of the variables is lower in Case 2 than in
Case 1. That is, the employment response is less when restrictions provide increased
bargaining power to nationals. Nevertheless, as mentioned before, measures that raise
productivity of the non-oil sector, improve matching efficiency, reduce the separation rate,
and lower search costs can have a marked impact on unemployment. Furthermore, less
reliance on mandatory measures (and, hence, less bargaining power for national workers) and
lower reservation wages reduce the unemployment rate quite significantly.

D. Policy Lessons
To recapitulate, the solution to the emerging labor market strains is closely connected to the
development of a vibrant non-oil private sector, investment in human capital, and
institutional reform in the labor market. A vibrant non-oil sector is necessary, although not
sufficient, to create the needed jobs. Investment in human capital and institutional reform
will likely facilitate the process of successfully matching local aspirants with jobs.
The specific lessons from the above discussion are as follows:
Employment Costs
Reducing the relatively high wages in the public sector is likely to lower the reservation
wage and increase the willingness of nationals to acquire skills or human capital valuable to
private sector employers. Announcing and enforcing strict limits on public sector hiring is
likely to further lower the reservation wage by decreasing the likelihood that the public sector
will act as the employer of first and last resort for nationals.
Separating wages and social benefits in the public sector, and providing benefits to all
working nationals—not just to those employed in the public sector—is likely to reduce the
incentive for nationals to seek public sector employment and lower the reservation wage.
Furthermore, giving time-specific subsidies for the employment of nationals will likely
increase private sector demand for them by reducing their employment costs [19].
Relatively higher firing costs for nationals, including lengthy appeals and investigation of
dismissals and direct government intervention, raises their relative cost of employment, thus
reducing demand. Therefore, establishing a clear set of rules for the appeal of dismissals,
including fines or penalties associated with wrongful dismissals, and a mechanism for the
rapid resolution of appeals are likely to lower the relative cost of employing nationals.

Skill Acquisition
Enhancing the human capital of nationals and the acquisition of skills that are valuable to the
private sector is likely to increase demand and employment. To this end, providing
education, including vocational training, reforming school curricula, encouraging firms to
establish internships, awarding scholarships as well as targeted training vouchers,
and fostering self employment will likely build necessary skills and expertise among
prospective national workers.
Investment in Capital and Knowledge
Facilitating the adoption of new technologies and the accumulation of capital is also likely to
increase private sector demand and employment by raising the productivity of nationals [20].
Continued outsourcing of government services and extending 100 percent foreign ownership
of companies to all non-oil economic activities will likely promote competition and improve
resource allocation, leading to higher productivity and investment.

VI. CONCLUSIONS
Labor market strains are emerging in GCC countries because of a rapidly growing labor
force. Economic diversification efforts under way address this issue by enhancing non-oil
growth and in turn job creation. However, these efforts need to be complemented with
investment in human capital and adoption of institutional reforms in the labor market to
facilitate the substitution of national workers for expatriate workers without hindering
employment dynamics and the economy’s competitiveness.
An effective employment strategy for nationals in GCC countries would include:
•

Increasing the relative attractiveness of working in the private sector by lowering the
wage differential between the public and private sectors; making social benefits
available to all working nationals; irrespective of sector of employment; and
announcing strict limits on public sector employment.

•

Reducing disparities in labor mobility by creating a level playing field between hiring
or firing national workers vis-à-vis expatriate workers.

•

Encouraging skill acquisition among nationals by strengthening educational and
vocational training, providing time-specific incentives, such as subsidies to
companies for training and scholarships, and promoting self-employment.

•

Facilitating improvements in productivity and investment in capital by outsourcing
government services, and extending the possibility of majority foreign ownership in
the economy.

•

Using price- and market-based rather than quantity-based market interventions to
encourage the substitution of national workers for expatriate workers and to maintain
labor market flexibility, which is key to non-oil growth and competitiveness. The
impact of quantity-based market intervention on employment generation for nationals
is at best ambiguous.

Future research on this subject could gather more data to calibrate the model presented above
and precisely quantify the impact of the different policy recommendations. The model
presented above could also be developed further to explicitly include the hiring of expatriate
workers and the degree of complementarities or substitutability between the different skill
types of expatriate workers and national workers.

APPENDIX I
Summary of Current Labor Market Policies in the GCC Countries
Bahrain

Kuwait

Oman

Saudi Arabia

U.A.E.

Substitution
policies in the
government
sector

Public sector
gives priority to
nationals.

Public sector gives
priority to nationals.

Public sector gives
priority to nationals.
Government intention is
to increase Omanization
rate in the public sector to
95 percent by 2020.

Public sector gives
priority to nationals
with an indicative target
of 85 percent of Saudis.

Quotas on
expatriates

Restriction in the
number of
approved work
visas.

Restriction in the
number of approved
work visas.

Restriction in the
number of approved
work visas.

Quotas on
nationals

Firms are
requested to
increase
employment of
nationals by
5 percent a year
until one-half of
the labor force is
Bahraini.
New
establishments
employing 10 or
more workers
are required to
have 20 percent
Bahrainis in
their workforce,
with further
annual increase
of 5 percent until
50 percent is
reached.
Firms of less
than
10 employees
must employ at
least one
Bahraini other
than the owner.

Private sector
industrial
establishments are
required to have
nationals
representing at least
25 percent of their
labor (Industrial
Law 6, 1965).

Ceilings by region are set
on the annual influx of
expatriates. Labor permits
are issued in priority to
firms that meet their
Omanization target.
Targets were set in 1994
for the employment of
nationals by sector. Firms
with more than four
employees had two years
to comply or they would
be fined an amount equal
to half the wage bill of the
workers that should have
been hired to reach the
target. Application was
initially lenient but has
been tightened recently.
Firms that do not meet the
Omanization target of
their sector are required to
hire one Omani to get a
work permit for a new
expatriate worker.

A 1992
regulation
requires that
ministries hire
expatriates only
if no national on
the list of job
seekers has the
necessary
qualifications.
Restriction in the
number of
approved work
visas.

Ban to hire
expatriates in
certain
industries

The 2000 Labor
Market Law
stipulates the
proportion of
Kuwaitis that private
sector companies
must have in their
workforce. This
varies from sector to
sector and within
sectors, depending
on the size and
nature of their
operations.
Companies that fail
to meet this target
would be subject to
a fine and sanctions.
Work permit issued
for foreign workers
are confined to
selected activities in
the private sector
(1994 Amendment
107 to Labor Law).

Ban on expatriates
performing jobs that do
not require special
training programs.

Number of nationals
employed in private
establishments should
not be less than
75 percent of the
workforce and their
wages no less than
51 percent of total wage
bill (Art. 45 of the
Labor and Workman
Law 1969).
Firms with more than
20 employees must raise
the ratio of their Saudi
workforce by 5 percent
a year until they reach
the targets.

Sector specific
restrictions on issuing
work permits for foreign
workers. Issuance and
renewal of work permits
were stopped in many
unskilled professions.
Some job categories,
such as administration,
security, and recently
agricultural products
trading in the municipal
market, are reserved for
nationals.

No formal
targets, except
on the share of
nationals
employed in the
public
enterprises and
the banking
sector. Banks
must increase
their national
workforce by
4 percent per
year until they
meet the target.
Firms seeking
work visas for
female
expatriate
employees
sponsored by
their husband or
father must
employ an
additional
national to get
the permit.

Fees for use of
expatriate labor

Fee on a visa for
a foreign
worker.
Companies with
more than 100
workers and do
not provide
internal training
pay a charge for
training to the
ministry of labor
and social affairs
equivalent to
1 percent of total
annual wages of
the local labor
force and
3 percent of
foreign workers’
wages.

Bahrain
Cash benefits
and other
incentives to
employ nationals

Payments of up
to BD 1000 a
year to midsize
private
manufacturing
firms in which
30 percent of the
workforce is
Bahraini.

Education and
training

The Bahraini
Training Center
has been
reformed and
empowered to
expand publiclyprovided
training.

The government has
initiated several
steps in the area of
training to be
financed by a
2.5 percent tax on
companies listed on
the Kuwait Stock
Exchange.

Since 1994, a fee equal to
7 percent of the worker’s
annual salary is imposed
on the use of foreign
labor. Fee revenues are
used as “training
contributions.”

Fees for visas, work
permits and residence
permits.

Fees for issuing
a work visa and
for visa renewal.
Annual fee
payable by
expatriate
employers of
household help.

Kuwait

Oman

Saudi Arabia

U.A.E.

Government
contracts are only
provided to
domestic firms in
which 40 percent of
the labor force is
national, earning at
least 40 percent of
the firm’s total wage
bill.

Firms that meet their
Omanization target are
given priority
consideration for
concessionary loans,
exemptions from duties
on machinery and raw
materials, and priority in
the awarding of
government contracts.
Soft finance, tax
exemptions, and business
support services are
offered to nationals who
create their own business.
The Vocational Training
System, financed with the
proceeds of the fees on
expatriate labor, ia a
system of privatelyprovided training to
nationals who must first
be matched with
employers that commit to
hiring them after the
completion of the
training.

Firms that do not
comply with the
Saudiization program
could be subject to
refusal of visa requests
or work permit
renewals, and could be
banned from
government contracts
bids, loans, and
subsidies

Extend payment of
the social allowance
for Kuwaiti workers
in the private sector.
Payment of
unemployment
benefits for workers
until they find a job.

Enhance private
sector benefits

Civil service
retrenchment
Mobility,
placement

Fees for visas, work
permits, and
residence permits
were raised. Flat fee
on hiring domestic
servants.

Employment
Service Bureau
created in 1997

Five Year Development
Plan sets out specific
targets for general and
higher education and for
technical and vocational
training with the
establishment of Human
Resource Development
Fund.
Financial support is
given to firms
committed to training
nationals.

Initiate the extension of
the pension scheme to the
private sector to increase
its attractiveness.

Reduction in the number
of civil servants by 13,500
from 1996-98.
Additional flexibility in
the dismissal legislation.
Expatriate workers are

The labor ministry’s job
matching and placement
program is currently run

School curricula
have been
revised to focus
on vocational
training.
Local
government and
chambers of
commerce
provide training
and internships
financed by their
own resources.
A benefit
pension scheme
for nationals in
the private sector
was introduced
in 1999.
Foreigners are
subject to higher
water and
electricity tariff
rates.

In 1997, transfer
of sponsorships
between

support, and
information
dissemination
policies
Enforcement of
legislation on
visa
requirements
and work
restrictions

Unemployment
benefits

to handle job
matching and
placement
support for
Bahraini job
seekers.
Recent
campaign to
enforce
immigration law.
Illegal workers
are offered a
grace period to
legalize their
stay or leave the
country. Failure
to comply would
result in legal
action.

allowed with the approval
of their employer to move
between sponsors, without
being forced to leave the
country.
Recent campaign to
enforce immigration
law. Illegal workers
are offered a grace
period to legalize
their stay or leave
the country. Failure
to comply would
result in legal action.

in 37 regional labor
offices, with 5 more
expected to open in
2000-01 with special
focus on private sector
vacancies.
Recent campaign to
enforce immigration
law. Illegal workers are
offered a grace period to
legalize their stay or
leave the country.
Failure to comply would
result in legal action.

employers
became possible
after one year of
service subject
to the approval
of all parties.
Recent
campaign to
enforce
immigration law,
including that
expatriates
should work
only for their
sponsor. Illegal
workers are
offered a grace
period to
legalize their
stay or leave the
country. Illegal
workers can be
subject to
imprisonment
for up to 3 years
and fined up to
Dh 30,000.

The Manpower and
Government
Restructuring
Program established
in 2001 will provide
benefits to Kuwaiti
nationals.

Source: Updated from Table 3 in Megarbane (2001).

APPENDIX II
A MATCHING MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT FOR NATIONALS IN THE GCC
ECONOMIES
Basic Setup
There are two types of agents—national workers and private-sector firms. Nationals either
are employed by firms or search for employment. Firms with vacancies search for employees
to fill their vacancies. A filled or a matched position produces output. Matches are broken
exogenously.
Workers
Suppose that there are Nt nationals in the labor force at time t, and suppose that the national
labor force is growing at a rate, gN. Workers are identical, infinitely lived, risk neutral, and
are indexed on the interval [0, Nt]. They have a common discount factor, β = 1/(1+r), where
r is the world real interest rate.

When employed by a private-sector firm, a worker receives a wage, w. Assume further that
an employed worker also receives benefits, bE ≥ 0, from the government. Therefore, the total
compensation of an employed national in the private sector is w+bE.
When not employed, a worker is assumed to have a reservation wage, bu, that reflects the
benefits and payments received from the government. The higher the benefits and payments,
the higher the reservation wage.
Firms
Firms employ workers to produce output based on a constant-returns-to-scale technology.
Assume that one worker, when employed, produces y units of output. The level of output per
worker, or equivalent labor productivity, depends upon the level of technology (or total
factor productivity) and capital per worker. Improvements in technology and higher levels of
capital per worker raise labor productivity and output. Increases in the level of skill
(or efficiency of the worker), h, also raise output.
When a job is filled, the firm pays the employee, w, and earns, (y – w). When a job is vacant,
the firm incurs a cost, c, of searching for an employee. If there is a small number of suitable
nationals, then it may be quite costly for firms to search for them.
Jobs, or matches, are destroyed with probability s; that is, at each point in time, a fraction s of
employed workers loses their jobs. In other words, s is the given separation rate. When a
match is destroyed, firms must pay a separation cost, cs. For higher values of cs,
job destruction is more costly for the firm.
Assume that firms are owned by nationals, which is an appropriate assumption for the GCC
countries. Consequently, firms have the same discount factor as nationals, β = 1/(1+r).
Matching Function
Successful matches between nationals looking for private-sector employment and firms
looking to hire workers is given by the matching function, M(U,V), where M denotes the
number of successful matches, U is the number of unemployed nationals, and V is the
number of job vacancies posted by firms. Assume that M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree
one. Let q denote the probability of filling a vacancy, M(U,V)/V. Let θ be a measure of the
tightness of the labor market, V/U; as the labor market becomes tighter, θ increases. Note that
since M(U,V) is homogeneous of degree one, q is a function of θ: q(θ) = M(U,V)/V.
Furthermore, the probability of an unemployed national finding a job is θ q(θ) = M(U,V)/U.
Assume for simplicity, as in the literature, that M = A Uα V1-α, where α ∈ (0,1) is the
elasticity of matches with respect to unemployment, and A is the efficiency of the matching
“technology” or process. Measures that raise A increase the efficiency of the process and
shorten the time to find a match. These measures comprise information dissemination and,
more generally, job search support, including internships.

Solution of the Model
In each time period, there is a flow of young nationals, including women, entering the work
force and looking for jobs. Unemployed workers are also looking for jobs. Existing jobs, or
matches, are being destroyed with probability s. At the same time, firms are looking to fill
vacancies, and M successful matches are occurring. Therefore, the change in unemployment
is given by:
U t +1 = U t + ( N t +1 − N t ) + s ( N t − U t ) − θt q (θt )U t
Dividing by Nt, substituting for the unemployment rate, u = U/N, and rewriting the equation
yields:
(1 + g N )ut +1 = ( s + g N ) + [1 − s − θ t q (θt )]ut
with [s+gN] referring to the increase in the unemployment rate due to the flow into
unemployment, and θ q(θ) u referring to the decrease due to the flow out of unemployment
through successful matches.
In steady state, u is constant. The steady state unemployment rate, uss, is
s + gN
u ss =
s + g N + θ ss q(θ ss )
where θss is the steady state value for the market tightness indicator, θ. The impact of an
increase in labor force growth, gN, implies a rise in steady state employment for a constant
level of θss q(θss).
To close the model, we need to solve for θss. We do this under two scenarios. The first
scenario describes the current state in GCC labor markets where, in general, wages may be
thought of as given by the internationally competitive wage, w*. Workers have no bargaining
power as firms have access to an elastic supply of expatriate workers at w*. The second
scenario describes a possible situation where there are quantitative restrictions on the
employment of expatriates, giving some bargaining power to national workers.
Case 1: No wage bargaining
To solve for θss, consider the firm’s valuation of a filled job and a vacancy. The valuation of
a filled job, VJ, is given as follows:
VJ = ( y − w*) + β [ s (−cs + VV ) + (1 − s )VJ ].
In the current period, the firm earns profits of y–w*. In the next period, the match is broken
with probability s; the firm pays the separation cost, cs, and will have the valuation of a
vacancy, VV. With probability (1–s), the match will continue and the firm will have the
valuation of a filled position, VJ.
The valuation of a vacancy, VV, is given by:

VV = −c + β [q(θ ss )VJ + {1 − q(θ ss )}VV ].
The firm incurs a cost, c, of searching. In the next period, the vacancy is filled with
probability, q(θss), and the firm will receive a valuation, VJ. With probability, 1– q(θss), the
vacancy is not filled, and the firm will receive, VV.
The zero profit condition, following from free entry, implies VV = 0, which leaves two
equations in two unknowns, VJ and θss. The solution for θss and uss are given by:
 A ( y − w * − β scs ) 
θ =

(r + s )
c

ss

1

α

1

u ss =

1

1−

1 + ( s + g N ) −1 Aα c

1

α

1

−1

1−

( y − w * − β scs ) α (r + s )

1

α

The comparative statistics are given by:
= u ( y, A, s, c, cs , w*, g N )
− − + + +
+
+
In other words, the unemployment rate increases with increases in the separation rate, s, the
cost of searching, c, the wage rate, w*, and the cost of separation (or firing), cs. It reduces
with increases in productivity, y, and the efficiency of the matching process, A. Therefore,
lowering the unemployment rate entails enacting measures to increase the productivity of the
non-oil private sector, y, including through human capital investment, and institutional
reforms that raise the efficiency of the matching process, A, and reduce the costs of
searching, c, and of separation, cs. In addition, investment in human capital can lower the
probability of separation, s, and, hence, the unemployment rate.
u ss

Case 2: Expatriate labor restrictions and wage bargaining
Restrictions on the employment of skilled and semi-skilled expatriates lead to an increase in
the bargaining power of national workers vis-à-vis firms. Therefore, wages are no longer
determined by the internationally competitive wage, but by a bargaining process between
national employees and firms.
To solve for θss, consider the worker’s valuation of being employed versus being
unemployed. When employed, the worker’s valuation is given by:
VE = ( w + bE ) + β [ sVU + (1 − s )VE ],
where VU is the valuation when unemployed. In the current period, the worker receives
wages and benefits of w+bE. In the subsequent period, the worker becomes unemployed with
probability s and receives a valuation VU, or remains employed with probability (1–s).

When unemployed, the worker’s valuation is:

VU = bU + β [θ ss q(θ ss )VE + {1 − θ ss q(θ ss )}VU ].
In the current period, the unemployed worker receives payments of bU from the government.
With probability θssq(θss), the worker finds employment, but remains unemployed with
probability 1–θssq(θss).
Note that if w+bE < bU, then workers find it more beneficial to remain “unemployed”—at the
expense of the government. Reducing unemployment, therefore, entails reducing
“unemployment” benefits or public sector compensation, if the public sector is continuing to
act as the employer of last resort.
The bargaining process is characterized by Nash bargaining. The total match surplus, S, is the
sum of the worker’s and the employer’s share: S ≡ (VE – VU)+ VJ, where
VJ = (y – w) + ß[s( -c + Vv ) + (1 – s)VJ ] is the firm’s valuation of a filled position [21].
It is shared according to the Nash product:
max (VE −VU ),VJ (VE − VU )φ VJ 1−φ
S = (VE − VU ) + VJ

s.t.

where φ ∈ [0,1] is the worker’s share of the one-period surplus. Indeed, (VE – VU) = φ S and
VJ = (1–φ) S. If φ = 0, the firm captures the entire surplus, whereas if φ = 1, the worker
captures the entire surplus.
The solution for w and θss may be derived from the following four equations:
w + bE − bU
w + bE − bU
VE − VU =
=
ss
ss
1 − β [1 − s − θ q (θ )] 1 − β [1 − s − A(θ ss )1−α ]
VJ =

c
c
=
ss
β q (θ ) β A(θ ss ) −α

VJ =

y − w − β scs
1 − β (1 − s )

VE − VU
φ
=
VJ
1−φ
The equations may be re-written to show that:

w = φ ( y − β scs + cθ ss + bE − bU ) − (bE − bU )
Since φ = 0 corresponds to the case of w = w*, φ > 0 implies w > w*.

Further algebra may be used to show that the steady state unemployment rate, uss, is obtained
by solving the following two equations:
1
1
u ss =
=
−1 ss
ss
1 + ( s + g N ) θ q(θ ) 1 + ( s + g N ) −1 A(θ ss )1−α

c[1 − β (1 − s)](θ ss )α + cβ Aφθ ss = β A(1 − φ )( y − β scs + bE − bU )
The comparative statistics are as follows:
= u ( y, A, s, c, cs , φ , bE , bU , g N )
− − + + + + −
+
+
The difference between this specification and the earlier one is the endogenous determination
of wages. The signs in all other variables remain as before. An increase in the bargaining
power of nationals, reflected in an increase in φ, raises the wages of nationals at the expense
of firm profitability. This results in an increase in the unemployment rate. An increase in
unemployment compensation also raises the unemployment rate by raising the wage at which
nationals are employed in the private sector. On the other hand, greater government benefits
to nationals employed in the private sector lowers the unemployment rate because workers
are willing to accept lower wages from firms, which increases the firm’s surplus.
u ss
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[1] The GCC countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates.
[2] Labor statistics in GCC countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)—are scant and vary significantly across countries in terms of
coverage, quality, measurement, and timeliness. In addition, the data available are incomplete
because information on military and security personnel is excluded. Statistics on
unemployment are also not regularly collected.
[3] The United Nations Arab Human Development Report (2002) projects for the GCC area
a sharp increase in the population aged 0 to 14, from close to 9 million in 2000 to 14 million
by 2010.
[4] See the United Nations Development Program (2002), Chapter 3.
[5] In the U.A.E., Goyal (2003) estimated that labor growth accounted for nearly one-third of
non-oil growth in the 1980s, and more than one-half in the following decade.

[6] This phenomenon, know as the Dutch disease, refers to the negative output and
employment effects caused by an oil (or natural resource) boom on the non-oil sector of the
economy, particularly exports, leading to an overall contraction in the country’s tradable
sector.
[7] In the 1970s and 1980s, most expatriate workers were coming from other Arab countries.
[8] In most GCC countries, the retirement age for men is 60 years old and for women 55
years old, but they can retire with full benefits after 20 years of service. In addition, in all of
these countries, employee contribution to the pension fund is relatively low (5 percent) or nil
(Qatar). Expatriate workers are not covered by retirement benefits, but they usually receive a
month’s salary for every year of service as compensation.
[9] The reservation wage is the threshold wage at or above which national workers would
decide to supply their labor services and below which they would not.
[10] Illiteracy is mainly concentrated among women and the population aged 40 years and
above. For instance, in Saudi Arabia, illiteracy among the female population was almost
29 percent in 2000, while it was less than 3 percent for the population below 29 years.
[11] According to Al-Lamki (2002), in Oman, the remuneration package in the government
sector for unskilled and semi-skilled work is twice that of the private sector.
[12] In Oman, the target for nationalization of the labor force was only achieved in the
banking sector (set at 90 percent), reflecting the opportunity provided to nationals through
education (a banking institute was created in the early 1980s) to acquire the skills required by
the sector.
[13] Goyal (2003) analyzed national employment in the U.A.E. using a simple labor demand
and supply model.
[14] The standard literature has primarily examined unemployment dynamics in the context
of business cycles and the secular rise of unemployment in Europe.
[15] Detailed derivations are provided in Appendix II.
[16] The model follows the setup in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000).
[17] Note that y also denotes average labor productivity.
[18] This would constitute a one-time increase in levels of employment.
[19] The fiscal cost will need to be less than the employment benefit for the policy to be
welfare improving. These subsidies could be financed, for instance, by fees on skilled
expatriate workers.

[20] Such investment would increase output and productivity, y, and matching efficiency, A,
and reduce the separation probability, s, and the cost of search, c.
[21] Recall that the firm’s valuation of a vacancy is V = 0, owing to the zero profit
assumption.
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